Innovation is associated to high cost and high level of risk. Many rms cannot nance this activity with internal nancial resources. They need outside investors to nance their innovative projects. Venture capitalist funding seems to be an appropriate alternative especially when the rm is young. In this paper we study the relationship between a rm's innovation activity and venture capital. We have used dierent databases on innovative activity and venture capital nancing in France's manufacturing sector for the period 1993-2006. First we examine the eect of venture capital nancing on innovation, and second the impact of rms' innovation on venture capitalists' behaviour towards these rms. Our results show that the presence of venture capitalists enhances the innovation intensity of a rm. Innovation is also an indicator that attracts venture capitalist.
Introduction
In economic theory there are two visions of innovation activity. In the conservative vision, innovation is not a natural activity for a company. Firms require a special organization and environment to innovate. In the entrepreneurial vision, innovation is an essential and strategic activity of rms. According to that vision, companies are involved in innovative activity unless barriers make it dicult or impossible (Miller and Friesen (1982) [28] ). The contribution of innovative rms to a country's economic growth has been discussed in the academic literature showing that creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge are real catalysts for economic growth. The research and development activity (R&D) of rms contributes to the improvement and dynamism of research as well as to economic growth and job creation. Indeed, at the end of World War II, American senator Ralph Flanders declared in 1946 that "the postwar prosperity to America depends in a large measure on nding nancial support for that comparatively small percentage of new ideas and developments which give promise of expanded production and employment, and an increased standard of living for the American people. We cannot oat along indenitely on the enterprise and vision of preceding generations. To be condent that we are in an expending, instead of a static or frozen economy, we must have a reasonably high birth rate of new undertakings." (Hsu and Kenney (2005) [20] )
However, innovation is a source of many risks that range from its nancing to its operation (Laperche 2003 [23] , Metrick 2007 [26] ). These risks are mainly related to the very fact of innovating since this activity concerns the adaptation of a new product or process that is a far cry from the initial technology of the rm. Metrick (2007) [26] has identied three types of risks related to innovation. First technological risk, dened as the uncertainty of the technological success of the invention, then commercial risk related to the market and consumer perception of the new product or process, and nally, competition risk associated with the behavior of competitors towards the new product. These risks as well as the entrepreneur's specialization and the nature of the SMEs' assets reduce the possibility of accessing traditional nancing resources by bank loans (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009 [16] ). Bankers are risk-averse agents and require real credit guarantees before granting a loan. However, there are no such guarantees in the case of innovative projects. In fact, as we have indicated, there is a high probability of non-payment of debt by the entrepreneur due to technological and commercial risks. Even in case of bankruptcy, the rm's assets cannot cover its debt because of the very specic nature of the project and the lack of a secondary market.
It is also obvious that there is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and rm size. Thus, when the rm is in the creation process, it has little cash while, at this stage, it requires high amounts of investment. Its R&D expenditure and its intangible investment are important compared to its liquidity and the nancial capacity of its initial shareholders. However, the lack of liquidity can deter entrepreneurs from creating and developing their start-up. Consequently, entrepreneurs are inclined to seek the help of nancial "experts" who are willing to invest, often in high quantity, in uncertain projects. The limited guarantees provided by entrepreneurs reduce the possible sources of nancing. For small and very specic industry businesses which are characterized by a high level of risk, the traditional means of nancing, namely bank loans, are not adapted to their needs. Thus, these rms need to nd an alternative funding if they are motivated to innovate. Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) [35] indicate that the academic literature has often considered venture capital as a driving force behind innovation. However, the direction of this relationship can be reversed since the advent of new technologies can increase the demand for venture capital which can result in increasing the number of start-ups. These authors focused on American manufacturing sectors to examine the causality between innovation and venture capital. Their results show that the growth of the total factor productivity (a measure of innovation) is positively related to the VC investment. Nevertheless, their ndings on the reverse relationship are mitigated and depend on the industry (in the IT and communication sectors the impact of innovation on VC investment is positive but it is negative for the drug and scientic instruments industries).
Our research is based on studies that were conducted in the U.S. and European markets (Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) [35] , Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) [9] , Geronikolaou and Papachristou (2008) [18] , etc). These studies on the role played by VCs in the development of innovative rms represent the starting point of our questions and assumptions. They led us to ask two questions concerning this role and to which we will try to respond using an econometric analysis.
The study of these questions requires theoretical and empirical research. To our knowledge, no in-depth empirical study about the relationship between innovation, R&D expenditures and VC, was conducted on non listed companies. Besides, academic literature has so far focused on listed rms (e.g. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) [9] ) and has consequently ignored smaller rms which are the most important targets of VCs, which explains why the present study is pertinent. Empirically, we have attempted to answer these two questions using various statistical tools and econometric models on French data.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the risks that are associated with rms' innovative activity. Section 3 develops the importance of VC in the nancing of innovative rms. Section 4 contains the empirical study of the paper where we present our data as well as our econometrical methodology and the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.
SMEs and the risk of innovation
The nancial constraint is a major obstacle to innovation. The Schumpeterian hypothesis favors large rms in innovative projects because R&D expenditures have, in general, relatively high xed costs. This cannot be achieved if the rm's sales are not large enough. Moreover, large rms are in a better situation than small ones to access external funding sources (Symeonidis, 1996 [34] ). Nooteboom (1994) [30] underlines that the risk-taking, the lack of synergy and the limited nancing resources for growth are the small rms' weaknesses for innovation. Rosen (1991) [32] supports the idea that large rms invest more in R&D. But he argues that these large rms prefer investing in the existing technology as well as in small improvements of the existing product. So, they are not always interested in radical innovation. Thus, small rms can propose a large part of radical innovations in the market without necessarily investing more in R&D compared to large rms. This may be possible because of strategy dierences between large and small rms. Cohen and Klepper (1996) [12] present a model in which small and large rms have the same productivity in a project and the same costs in R&D. The criteria that distinguish these rms lie in the type of innovation (radical or incremental) in which they are interested, as well as in the growth target to be reached. While large rms have a great incentive to pursue all types of innovation (radical or incremental innovations), this incentive is relatively bigger for innovations that depend more on the operational results (based on their existing products or services). This includes process innovations and more incremental innovations.
It is dicult for small rms to invest in innovation using their own internal resources. In this case, possible solutions include government grants, collaboration with other small or large rms, as well as public institutions (e.g. universities). Link and Rees (1990) [24] nd that large rms are more active in academic research (industry-university relationship), but that the small ones seem to be able to use their university partners to reinforce their R&D projects to a larger scale than large rms. Acs et al. (1994) [1] also suggest that small rms innovate by exploiting the knowledge created by research in universities as well as the knowledge spillover from large rms' R&D projects. Santoro and Chakrabarti (2002) [33] show that industrial rms use a variety of industryuniversity relationships to accomplish various tasks. Large rms intensely transfer knowledge and strongly support research to improve their skills and knowledge and to have access to academic expertise in the technology segment in which they are not specialized. The aim is to improve their non-core competence. Small rms, however, cooperate with academic research centers to improve their core competence. Santoro and Chakrabarti (2002) [33] indicate that small rms cannot optimally use the industry-university relationship. This is a major disadvantage for small rms because this relationship can oer the complementary competence, knowledge and resources these rms need. The industry-university relationship can reduce the technological risk of innovation but it cannot inuence the two others risks, which are commercial and competitive risks. These two types of risks are always the essential risks of innovation for small rms and they should therefore seek a more eective way to control them (other than the industry-university relationship).
Inter-rm cooperation can be considered as another solution for small rms to overcome the nancial constraints of innovation. The study of Almeida and Kogut (1997) [4] on citing patents shows that small rms are more attached to local (or regional) networks of knowledge than large rms. Ahuja (2000) [3] argues that the inter-rms network contains dierent relations based on dierent outputs. The output of direct relations is the shared prot, as well as shared knowledge, but in the case of indirect relations, the partners can only obtain the shared knowledge. The number of direct relations for a rm can inuence its innovative activity by oering three advantages: knowledge sharing, complementarity and economies of scale. In an empirical study, Negassi (2004) [29] nd that the impact of inter-rm cooperation on the success of the rms' innovative activities is weak. Large rms present more incentives to collaboration in R&D projects compared to small ones (Negassi 2004 [29] , Colombo 1995 [13] ). These large rms tend to collaborate with other large rms rather than with small ones (Dogson 1993 [14] ). Harabi (2002) [19] argues that the vertical cooperation in R&D which consists in improving the relationship between innovative rms, on the one hand, and the suppliers as well as the user of innovation, on the other hand can enhance the investment in R&D and thus increase innovative activity. Small rms' cooperation strategy, particularly when they cooperate with large rms, can reduce the commercial risk of innovation. Indeed, the market power and the diversity of large rms oer an opportunity to small rms to benet from their partners' knowledge of the market and demand. This strategy can also reduce the technological risk of innovation by exploiting the accumulated knowledge of large rms. In fact, large rms invest continuously in R&D activity and their accumulated knowledge in this activity can reduce the technological risk of innovation.
The impact of cooperation on competitive risk is not clearly determined. On the one hand, large rms can transfer their knowledge on market competition to small ones and thus reduce the information asymmetry. But, on the other hand, they can be a new source of risk related to large rms. Besides, large rms can transmit their resistance to innovation to small rms (resistance to innovate out of their traditional domain, or resistance to cannibalization 1 ). To mitigate these nancing problems, researchers consider that nancing through venture capitalist rms (VCs) is adapted to innovative rms (Chabbal 1997 [11] , Bekolo and Beyina 2009 [7] ). These VCs are nancial intermediaries who raise funds from other investors, like pension funds, banks, insurance companies, etc., in order to invest in young and innovative companies with a high growth potential. The main source of income for VCs is made when they exit the nanced company. For this purpose, VCs pay great attention to the selection of rms, and invest in sectors with a strong innovative character and in which they have skills and technological expertise. Thus, VCs coach these companies as they also provide them with advice and their know-how throughout their engagement period thus sharing the risks taken by the entrepreneur. In this kind of nancing, the nanced company does not pay back the capital. VCs are remunerated by the sale of their capital allocation at the exit time. So, if the company fails, the invested funds are lost (partially or completely). However, if the nanced company succeeds, VCs get a very strong capital gain. Consequently, they are motivated and implicated in guiding entrepreneurs to the success of their company. Throughout this innovation process, the entrepreneur must work with his nancier in order to bring the product or the innovative process to an operating and marketing stage. VC companies are presented as a nancier that helps SMEs to take o and to grow through their operational support. The success of the backed rm also depends on its technological contribution and market receptivity. Moreover, many young rms may not reach their break even due to lack of funding. So, they resort to VC companies by oering them an equity allocation in their company in return for the risk taken and the amount of money awarded. This stake is also meant to reduce asymmetric information present in small rms, because VCs have a stranglehold on the business management and have a right to vote on the board of directors. Their role is therefore not limited to nancial support. They also contribute to decision making, management and especially to the establishment of ecient mechanisms of control and advice for the management team.
A study carried out on the European market by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) [9] shows that VCs support innovative European rms by providing them with the necessary funding for their creation and their development. Using a probit analysis, they show that the level of sales prior to receiving VC funding reduces the likelihood of obtaining funding. This is consistent with the idea that VCs are interested in companies that are in the early stages of their development and haven't yet reached the stage in which they sell their products and services.
Although the VC is not intended solely for small companies, a study by Xer [37] shows that SMEs are those that attract VCs the most : 85% of the number of investments carried out in 2006 was allotted to companies of less than 500 employees. Nevertheless, in terms of value, bigger companies actually receive the largest part of the funding (65% of the investments in value). Deals are thus more important when companies are larger (more than 500 employees). This justies the importance of studying the inuence of this type of funding on innovation.
In addition, the various studies carried out by the French association of capital investors (AFIC 2 ) show that the number of nanced investments, as well as the amounts allocated to each type of operation (starting, capital-development, buyout, etc.), have considerably evolved over the past few years, alternating between upward and downward movements. reached a total record of 12.6 billion euros invested by VCs in 1,558 companies. This seems encouraging for the future evolution of this kind of alternative nancing oered to innovative entrepreneurs. Experts also consider that decelerations in the venture capital market are not only due to sluggish economic conditions during the crisis and the high selectivity of fund providers but mainly due to the decrease of projects proposed by entrepreneurs themselves. It is also worth noting that the venture capital industry in the United States is much more developed than in France.
Some studies have examined the link between innovation and nancing through VC. Using a sample of European companies, Geronikolaou and Papachristou (2008) [18] , for example, show that innovation creates demand for VCs. They also indicate that patents can be a signal for VCs as it arms that the project is of good quality. Thus, because of asymmetric information and the irreversibility of the project, Geronikolaou and Papachristou (2008) [18] indicate that innovation generates the VCs' activity and not the reverse. These results contradict those of Kortum and Lerner (2000) [21] who, by using data on U.S. rms, demonstrate that, VCs and R & D have a signicant eect on the number of patent grants. Concerning the data on venture capital, we have used the database Thomson One Banker to select companies that have received funding from a private equity rm as well as the number of round tables and investors present in the company. Data on the amounts invested at each round are also collected (when available).
The denition and sources of variables used in our model are summarized in table 3.
[Insert table 3 about here]
Our database contains 1,071 observations corresponding to a total of 895 companies among which 805 are not backed by a VC (thereafter referred to as "non VC rms") and 90 received funding from a VC (thereafter referred to as "VC rms") over the period 1993 -2006. The criterion to select non VC rms is the size measured by manpower employed. For each VC rm, we selected rms in the same year with an equivalent size.
Descriptive statistics
Measures of innovation: The measures of technological change generally belong to one of the three main aspects of the innovation process: (1) a measure of the input in the innovation process, like the R&D expenditure or the share of the rm's employees involved in R&D activities; (2) the intermediate outputs of the innovation process, such as the number of inventions that were patented; or (3) a direct measure of the output of the innovation process (that is the nished innovative product) (Acs and Audretsch, 2005 [2] ).
In this study, we consider the number of patents as an indicator of innovation. It is a good measure for the innovation output even if the economic value of patents dier considerably from one industry to the other. Besides the propensity to patent innovations slightly varies among industries. Patents are the direct result of innovative activity. More specically they are the result of inventions that are supposed to have a commercial impact. We also use the R&D expenditure and the researchers number as inputs in the innovation process. Table 4 gives descriptive statistics of the dierent variables used in this study. The average number of patents published in France amounts to 0.912 with a median of 0. This low gure should be considered with caution because, as shown in Table 6 the number of non-innovative companies, in terms of number of patents, is three and a half times as high as the number of innovative companies. A similar phenomenon appears for the variable NbrInvest (the number of nancing rounds in the company), VCNbr (the number of VCs in the company during the nancing round) and VCAmt (the amount invested by VCs in companies).
[Insert table 4 about here]
Given that VCs and VC backed rms do not always report the transaction amount, the variable VCAmt is not always available, so the results of the descriptive statistics as well as the dierences of means tests and regressions for this variable may be biased.
Study of the Correlation: Table 8 represents the correlation matrix of the dierent variables used. Thus, in order not to bias the results of our regressions and to avoid autocorrelation of explanatory variables, we build several models that exclude, each time, the variables that are highly correlated (above 50 %). For example, the LSize and LSales variables have a correlation coecient of 0.89, so these two variables will not be used in the same model. 
Dierences of means tests
In order to see the dierences that can exist between VC rms and non VC rms, we carry out tests on dierences of means for each group. As can be seen in Table 5 , VC rms are characterized by a high number of researchers, and they publish more patents. The amount of their exports is more important. They also receive more funding and spend more in advertising. These dierences are statistically signicant. However, dierences of means concerning public funding of R&D as well as the amount of R&D expenditure are not signicant.
[ Insert table 5 about here] Furthermore, we carry out dierences of means tests on innovative and non-innovative rms, in terms of number of patents, in order to identify the characteristics that may distinguish these two groups. These tests show that the number of VC investments received by innovative rms is higher than for non-innovative companies. The same can be observed for the amount of VC received by innovative rms. These two results are statistically signicant. As expected, innovative companies employ more researchers, invest more in R&D and export more than non-innovative companies.
[Insert table 6 about here]
Statistical methodology Negative binomial distribution
The family of negative binomial distributions is a family with two parameters. Several settings can be considered including one that employs two real parameters p such as 0 <p <1 and a non-null integer r. Under this setting, the mass function of a random variable with a negative binomial distribution, denoted NegBin (r, p) is as follows for k = 0, 1, 2, ...:
r controls the deviation from the Poisson distribution and λ = r(p
This makes the negative binomial a robust alternative to the Poisson distribution, which approaches it when parameter r is large, but has a larger variance for the small values of r.
Granger causality test
The purpose of this section is to determine whether there are links between the innovative activity of a company and VC funding and to see which variable causes the other. More specically, does the fact that the company is nanced by a VC leads to increased patenting or is it the contrary, i.e. that increased innovation attracts VCs and encourages them to fund companies with innovative activities? The Granger causality test will be used in order to study the direction of causation that may exist between innovation and VC. (Mignon, 2008 [27] ).
The regressions considered in this work are as follows 5 :
and
P atentF r is the number of patents and V C is one of the VC proxies : the number of investment rounds, the number of VCs in the rm and the amount invested by the VCs. The results of this test are reported in table 7.
[Insert 
The determinants of venture capital
The purpose of this section is to provide an analysis of the main characteristics that push venture capitalists to invest in rms with a special focus on their innovative activity. To this end, we use the following regression:
Where V C it represents N br Invest it , LV CAmt it , V CN br it or V C_Binary it In this equation (5), the variable NbrInvest represents the number of funds provided by venture capitalists in the i th company at time t. LV CAmt i represents the amount invested by VCs in the i th company at time t. The determinants of these variables are: the cash ow of the rm, its productivity, size, investment, public grant (either for operation or for R& D), advertising, innovative activity (in terms of R&D expenditure or in terms of the number of patents) and the number of researchers employed in the rm.
The regression results are reported in Table 9 for the VC number of investment determinants, 10 for the amount invested by VCs determinants, 11 for the number of VC in the rm, and table 12 for the eect of the VC as a Binary variable. These dierent models take high correlations of some variables into account.
[Insert tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 about here] 4.6.1 Number of investment as a measurement of VC Regarding the model on the variable "NbrInvest", the values of the endogenous variable being integers, we can use the Poisson model and the negative binomial model. There may be signicant dispersion in the data, which reects the fact that a company may not have received funding from a VC in year t-1, but received several during year t. Thus, the median value taken by this variable, as shown in Table 4 is zero. This may be a problem to use the Poisson model. For this reason, we choose the negative binomial specication for this equation.
[Insert table 9 about here] VCs investment are often intended for small companies to improve or develop their activity. Our empirical results conrm this idea. Indeed, the impact of a rm's size (measured by its turnover and number of employees, as well as by the amount of its investments) on the number of VC round table (and the number of VCs) is signicantly negative. This means that large companies are not the main target of VC.
The innovative activity of a company has a complex eect on VCs' behavior. On the one hand, the expenses in R&D have a negative eect on the number of VCs. On the other hand, the number of patents as well as the number of researchers employed have a signicant and positive eect on the dependent variable. These results show that innovative companies attract VCs unless they are large enough to fund their activities with their own resources. This consolidates the previous result on the relationship between a rm's size and the number of VCs, since R&D expenditure is strongly correlated with rm size (see table 8 ).
The amount of R&D expenditure and the number of researchers can jointly represent the innovation intensity of a rm. However, we note that these two variables have the opposite eect on the number of VC investments. One explanation for these contradictory results is that VCs are interested in the intensity of continuous innovation (long term). The presence of a large number of researchers in a rm guarantees the continuity of its innovation.
An interesting result is related to a company's expenditure in publicity which has a positive and signicant eect on the number of VC fundings received. Given that VCs decide to invest after a study of proposals and requests from companies, the increase in the expenses in publicity by entrepreneurs is an eective strategy to induce favorable decisions.
The eect of public allocations on the dependent variable is not always the same. On the one hand, the government grant aimed at rms' innovative activities has no signicant eect. On the other hand, the operating subsidy has a positive and signicant eect on the number of funding received from the VCs. As the operating grant is mainly intended for start-ups which are prone to nancial problems, it is expected that VCs and the state jointly act to support this type of rm.
The fact that a company has access to the international market means that it is well established and big enough to use various external methods of funding such as bank loans.
Thus, there is a strong correlation between a rm's size and its exports (see correlation matrix 8)). We can therefore anticipate a negative relationship between exports and the number of round table, which is conrmed by the results of the empirical model. These results should be taken with caution because data for this variable is not always available. Indeed, we use the only database on private equity in France that seems exhaustive to us. The transactions amounts are often not mentioned in the reports because of the operators' lack of transparency.
Amount of investment as a VC measurement
The results show that there is no signicant relationship between rm size and the amount received from the VC. Regardless of the measure considered (number of patents, of researchers and R&D expenditure), innovative activity has a positive and signicant eect on the amounts of funding received from VCs. Advertising always seems to be an eective strategy to attract more funding from VCs.
There is an interesting result on the operating margin (EBE/Sales 6 ) generated by the company (or the rm's productivity or commercial protability, according to the INSEE 7 ). This variable has a negative and signicant eect on the amount granted by VCs. This result can be explained by the fact that rms with a low gross margin can not access conventional bank nancing but are compelled to request the support of VCs to develop their activities. Thus, this kind of rms require the largest funding amounts. It should be noted that the relationship between the number of VC round table and the EBE/Sales ratio is negative but not signicant, which means that having a low gross margin ratio does not attract a large number of VCs, but these are the companies that receive the highest amounts. It remains to be noted that the eect of this variable on the amount received is always low.
Although the regression results on VCAmt should be taken with caution, these models seem to better explain the VCs' behavior compared to models on the number of VC investment, since the values taken by the R 2 are higher.
The determinants of innovation

The number of patents as a measure of innovation
The number of patents is one of the traditional indicators of innovation. The empirical model that links the number of patents to the rms' characteristics can be presented as follows: In Equation (6), P atentF r i t represents the number of patents of the rm i at time t. The determinants of this variable are: rm size, its investment, public subsidies received (subsidies for exploitation or for R&D), its advertisement, its R&D expenditure, the number of VCs funding or the amount of VCs' investment, the number of researchers, its exports, the ratios of the nancial situation and global protability.
As the dependent variable (number of patents) only takes natural values and innovative rms do not apply for patents every year, the dependent variable can show a large level of dispersion. For this reason, we choose the negative binomial specication for this equation. Table 13 represents the empirical results concerning innovation (number of patents) and rm characteristics.
[Insert table 13 about here]
The relation between innovation and rm size has been the subject of a large number of studies. To summarize the results of these studies, we can say that the impact of size (number of employees or market share of the rm) on the rm's R&D activity is always positive and signicant. But rm size neither shows a clear impact on the number of patents nor on the sales of innovative products or services (see Symeonidis, 1996 [34] ).
In the studies based on "Innovation Surveys", the impact of a rm's size on innovation is clearly positive (Aranda et al. 2001 [5] , Rogers 2004 [31] ). Garcia-Vega (2006) [17] nds a negative relation between rm size and the intensity of R&D. But, he nds a positive relationship between rm size and its patent number. Our results show a negative impact of rm size (measured by the number of employees and the turnover) on its patent number. Indeed, large rms do have R&D activities but they are more interested in incremental innovations (improvement in existing products and not radical innovation) or in process innovation. Patenting this type of innovation is complex compared to product innovation.
The impact of public nancing of R&D, and operating grants on rms' patent number is always positive and signicant. The encouragement of public institutions concerning innovation is an ecient policy to enhance rms' innovative output. Firms' advertising always impacts positively the output of innovation (patents number). This variable has an indirect impact on innovation. In fact, to make an ecient advertising campaign, rms should present new products or services. As a consequence, a high advertising intensity is associated with intense innovations.
The presence of a rm on the international market has a complex impact on innovation outputs. Some studies nd a negative relation between exports and innovation (Love and Roper 1999 [25] , Drago and Wooden, 1994 [15] ), but others nd a positive impact of exports on innovation (Bhattacharya and Bloch 2004 [6] ). Our ndings conrm the results of the former. Our estimations show that exports have a negative impact on innovation output. Two hypotheses can be put forward to justify this observation. First, rms that act on international markets must deal with local companies that do not always compete on innovation but on the selling price or on market power. The second hypothesis proposes that the countries which are the destination of exports do not have ecient systems of industrial-intellectual property (patents protection system).
Is there a positive relation between the input and the output of innovation? The answer is not straightforward, as this relation depends on dierent factors. One of these factors, which can inuence this relation, is related to the measure of input and output of innovation. In our model, there are two measures for the input of innovation (the number of researchers and the amount of R&D expenditures) and one measure for the output of innovation (the number of patents granted). Our ndings show that the number of researchers positively impacts the rm's number of patents, but that R&D expenditures have a negative inuence on innovation output. As patenting is a process that takes time (a patent is obtained after some years, generally between one and ve years), the dependent variable should be delayed. This feature can not be implemented in our model because of the lack of temporal data. The number of researchers is a rigid variable that changes slowly. This variable may be more robust to explain the variation of patent number.
The presence of VC, measured by the number of VCs, the number of table rounds as well as the amount invested, always impacts positively the output of innovation. Firms backed by VC have greater incentives to innovate. VCs are investors who participate in the rm's management and thus ensure monitoring and ongoing advice. Moreover, they are experts who aim at developing the company. The rms that receive VCs support benet from this nancial source and this expertise to develop their innovations and to enhance the output of their R&D projects. Although this result is interesting, it may be biased by the fact that several years can pass from the achievement of innovation to the publication of the patent (from 1 to 5 years).
R&D expenditures as a measure of innovation
The intensity of rm R&D represents another indicator of innovation. To study the relation between innovation (measured by the R&D expenditure) and VC investment, we propose the following model:
+ β 5 LSU B it + β 6 LP U B it + β 7 P atentF r + β 8 EBIT DA/Sales it + β 9 CAF Sales it + β 10 LV CAmt + β 11 N brInvest it + β 12 LF IN AN CEP U B it + sit (7) In equation (7), RD it represents the R&D expenditures of rm i at time t. The determinants of this variable are: rm size, the investment, public subsidy received by this rm (Operating Grant or to R&D activity), its advertising, its patent number, the number or the amount of VC funding, its exports, the nancial ratios and its global protability. The endogenous variable in this model is a continuous variable. Indeed, in our database, most companies spend money on R&D; we can use the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The LM test of Breusch Pagan indicates the absence of heteroscedasticity in our model, the Durbin-Watson test does not conrm the presence of autocorrelation in our model. The empirical study gives more importance to the relation between rm size and R&D expenditure, rather than the relation between rm size and patent numbers (Symeonidis, 1996 [34] ). By using the number of employees as a measure of rm size, and the R&D expenditures as an indicator of the innovation intensity of the rm, Vossen (1999) [36] nds a positive relation between rm size and its innovation activity. He nds that the intensity of the relation varies between sectors, but that it is always positive.
Our results conrm the ndings of these authors, since we nd a positive and signicant impact of rm size (measured by the number of employees, turnover,or investment) on its R&D expenditures. The eect of public nancing, as well as the Operating Grant, is positive too. This conrms our preceding results concerning the positive impact of public subsidies on innovation. This impact is independent from the innovation measure.
Knowledge is a good that can be accumulated. This means that rms that, in the past, were engaged in innovation accumulate knowledge and, consequently, are more likely to succeed in their current innovation activity. However, this result depends on the sector in which the rm operates (Breschi and Malerba, 1997 [10] ). This condition can motivate rms to engage in R&D activity, particularly when they have already succeeded in an innovative project as they believe that the R&D activity has become less risky. Our empirical results are in conformity with this hypothesis, since we nd a positive impact of the number of patents on R&D activity.
We do not reject the hypothesis that the presence of VCs in the rm has a positive impact on innovation. In fact, we observe a positive eect of the number of VC investments on R&D expenditures (the eect of the amount of VC investment on R&D expenditures is positive, but not signicant). This means that rms spend more on R&D and take more risks when they are backed by a VC. This observation does not mean that rms use the total amount of VC in R&D projects, but that the presence of VC enhances the innovations of the rms by reducing their commercial and competitive risks.
We have developed two assumptions concerning the relation between innovation and exports. The empirical result of equation 7 conrms the second hypothesis. Indeed, as exports have a positive impact on R&D and a negative impact on the number of patents granted, the hypothesis that exports are not related to innovation is not reliable. But the hypothesis that the protection of innovation by patent deposit is less present in the global market can be conrmed. Given that the number of patents in our study is the number of patents granted in France, these ndings can be biased by the dierences in the patent protection systems in the international market.
We can conrm the hypothesis concerning the eect of advertising on innovation. The more a rm is ready to spend on advertising, the more likely it is to engage in innovation, so as to emphasize their innovations through advertising.
The ratios gross margin/turnover (EBITDA/Sales) and overall protability/turnover (CAFSales) have a negative and signicant impact on R&D expenditures. When a rm's protability and productivity rise, this rm has less incentive to innovate, because its profitability is already achieved and further innovations can be a source of numerous risks. However, this impact can be biased by the relation between a rm's turnover and its R&D expenditures, since there is a positive and signicant relation between these two variables.
Discussion and conclusions
Innovative activity is a source of various types of risks including technological, commercial and competitive risks. Given these risks, companies must rely on both internal and external sources of knowledge and funding. Large and small rms are not equally aected by these risks for two main reasons. First, the nature of the innovative activity of large rms is not the same as that of small businesses in the sense that large rms are very interested in developing their current activities and incremental innovations, while small rms are mainly interested in product innovation as well as radical innovations. The type and intensity of the risks incurred by performing innovative activities are not the same. Second, large companies have signicant internal resources for funding and knowledge whereas small businesses do not have enough internal resources to safely engage in innovative activity.
Given these risks, companies can adopt various strategies including grant applications, cooperation with research centers and with other companies, the application for bank loans and request for nancing by venture capital companies. Except for the rst and last strategy (public subsidy and funding by VCs), young rms face more constraints when trying to implement these strategies. Indeed, they often lack the necessary guarantees to access bank loans and they are not in a strong position to take advantage of cooperation with research centers and large enterprises. The lack of internal resources (nancial and non nancial), cooperation does not allow small rms to reduce the of their innovative activities.
Small rms can not rely on grants because public allocations, being limited, they can not be distributed to a large number of companies. Furthermore, public grants are strongly dependent on national or regional policies. Consequently, a change in these policies results in a change in the destination and amount of these grants.
VCs nancing seems to meet the needs of young companies that face the risks of innovative activities. VCs bring not only money but also their technological and commercial knowledge and their ability to manage risk. The advantage of this kind of nancing is the fact that these investors provide a continuous monitoring of company activities and give their expertise and experience throughout their period of funding. Nevertheless, not all companies can hope to have funding from a VC and can not rely solely on this nancing method 8 .
The two main questions that may arise about the relationship between venture capital and innovation are the following: are companies that receive funding from VCs more motivated to engage in innovative activity? And does an innovative company have more chances to raise funds from these VCs?
In the current study, we attempt to provide empirical answers to these questions concerning the French market. We build two groups of models. In the rst group, the VC represents the endogenous variable which is explained by dierent rm characteristics, among which its innovative activity. The endogenous variable in the second group of models is the innovative activity of the company that also depends on rm characteristics and on the presence of VCs in that company.
Our empirical results conrm the traditional assumptions that propose a priority for small businesses to access VC funding. Beginning an innovative activity may be a selection criterion for the VC as indicated by Geronikolaou and Papachristou (2008) [18] . We have indeed observed that the number of patents, and the number of researchers of a rm have a positive eect on the number and amount of VC funding. Even if the eect of the R&D expenditure is ambiguous, because it has a negative eect on the number of VC investment and a positive eect on the VC amount, we can say that innovative companies are sending a positive signal to VCs and are therefore more likely to receive funding compared to noninnovative companies.
Regarding the second question, the results show that the presence of VC in the company increases the intensity of innovation thus conrming the results of Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) [35] . We nd a positive eect of this type of funding on the number of rm patents, as well as on its R&D expenditure. The database provided by INSEE includes only rms in the manufacturing sector. It would be interesting to incorporate rms operating in the service sector (Internet, nancial products, etc.) to conrm whether our ndings still hold.
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